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Abstract: 
 
Data breaches represent massive infringements of privacy in today’s technologically driven 
society. As a major topic of political, economic, and moral debate, they deserve more attention. In 
this paper, I present an analysis of the public’s response to data breaches through an event study 
examination. By using the stock market as a proxy for the public’s response, I find that data breach 
announcements induce an average abnormal return of -.93% for the companies at fault. 
Furthermore, I conduct a cross-sectional analysis to determine how certain characteristics of the 
company and event drive the returns. I find that the public responds more negatively to breaches 
when a larger number of individuals are affected. I also delve into the implications of “privacy 
fatigue” and discover evidence suggestive that the public has grown tired of privacy violations.   
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I. Introduction 
 
The recent spike in data breaches is attributable to the industry-wide transition towards automation 
and the IoT (Internet of Things). Slowing down the growth is not simple. If a company cannot 
transition online quickly enough, they risk the loss of market share and competitive advantage. 
But by accelerating the process before conducting due diligence, these same companies run the 
risk of compromising consumer, employee, and client data.  
 
Data breaches represent a major cost for both the victims affected and companies at fault. 
Cybercriminals steal names, social security numbers, emails, phone numbers, addresses, and 
banking information. Not only can the victims endure financial loss, but identity theft and invasion 
of privacy. For the companies at fault, the costs of a data breach include penalties, customer loss, 
brand distrust, and litigation.  
 
Another problem arising from the recent influx of data breaches is the concept of “privacy fatigue”. 
Breaches seem to be occurring far more frequently than they should be. As a negative event to all 
facets of society, I would expect the public to hold the companies affected accountable. Yet the 
fact that breaches are exponentially growing year after year paints a different picture; one where 
the public does not seem to be negatively reacting enough to garner changes in security practices 
from companies. Has the growth of data breaches made people too tired to respond to violations 
of privacy?  
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In this paper, I will analyze the public’s response to data breaches through a stock market event 
study. Stock prices represent the market’s perceived value of a company. Assuming an efficient 
stock market that includes all information publicly available, the stock prices serve as a proxy for 
public opinion. When the announcements of data breaches are publicized, the changes in stock 
prices should reflect the public’s response.  
 
The paper has 2 goals; 
1. To quantify the public’s response to data breaches through an event study analysis.  
2. To quantify how certain characteristics of the company and event change the magnitude 
and direction of the response.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I will provide an overview of previous 
literature findings, briefly state my hypotheses, describe the data, explain the event study 
methodology, present my results, and conclude with final thoughts. 
 
II. Previous Literature 
 
Although following similar event study methods, previous literature exploring the stock market’s 
response to data breaches have returned mixed results. A summary of previous results is shown 
below in Table 1. The varied results are largely due to the differences in selection criteria and 
motivation. The Key Findings section contains the discoveries I found most interesting.  
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Table 1: Summary of Previous Literature Results 
Researchers Years 
Observed 
Sample 
Size 
CAR 
Results 
Key Findings 
Campbell et al. (2003) 
 
1995-2000 43 Insignificant - There is a highly significant 
negative reaction for 
breaches that relate to 
violations of confidentiality 
and no reaction for breaches 
unrelated to confidentiality 
- Press coverage differences do 
not drive the stock market’s 
reaction 
Garg et al. (2003) 1996-2001 22 -5.3% - Internet security stocks 
reacted positively to breaches 
before the market factored 
risks of breaches into the 
prices 
- Insurance companies reacted 
negatively to breaches before 
the market factored the 
benefits of increased cyber-
insurance sales 
Cayusoglu et al. 
(2004) 
1996-2001 40 -2.1% - The negative reactions have 
been increasing over time 
- Internet companies garner 
larger negative reactions than 
conventional firms 
- Investors penalize small 
firms more than large firms  
Acquisti et al (2006) 
 
2000-2006 79 -.58% - Larger firms with built up 
trust are affected more by 
negative announcements and 
are driving the negative 
results 
- Industry, data subject, and 
breach responsibility did not 
indicate a market trend  
Gatzlaff et al. (2010) 
 
2004-2006 77 -.46% - The negative reaction is 
stronger for companies with 
higher growth potential 
- Subsidiary companies 
mitigate the stock market’s 
negative reaction 
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- The stock market’s negative 
reaction is strongest in the 
most recent time periods 
Johnson et al. (2017) 2005-2014 467 -.37% - Breaches resulting from 
payment card fraud 
contributed the most to 
negative returns 
- There is a correlation 
between large firms and 
repeat offenders 
 
There are many limitations to the previous literature. The magnitudes of negative results and the 
characteristics driving the returns are inconsistent amongst the studies. The observed periods are 
outdated and not representative of the current state of data breaches. The limited frequency of data 
breaches bounds the benefits of a selective sample.  
 
My motivation for extending research on the stock market’s response to data breaches is to provide 
a more representative analysis of society’s current technological state. I will observe similar 
characteristics to previous studies and introduce the implications of “privacy fatigue”. 
 
III. Hypotheses 
 
I will attempt to reject the following hypotheses stated as the null: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The ACAR (Average Cumulative Abnormal Return) for companies that 
experience a data breach is zero. 
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Hypothesis 2: The fact that a company has experienced a data breach announcement prior 
to the current instance does not matter.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The size of the company does not matter. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The industry of the company does not matter.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The expected growth of the company does not matter.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The time period when the breach was announced does not matter.  
 
IV. Data 
 
My sample of data breaches draws from 3 datasets.  
 
The first dataset contains every data breach announcement with greater than 30,000 records lost 
from 2005 – 2018. The source of the data is “information is beautiful”, a data distillation and 
visualization website. The raw dataset includes 296 observations of companies that experienced a 
data breach in the allotted time frame. The other variables included are the year of announcement, 
number of records lost, industry, and source of announcement. I subset the data to only include 
observations with greater than 50,000 records lost and companies that were publicly traded on a 
major US stock exchange (Nasdaq, NYSE, or AMEX) at the time of the data breach 
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announcement. This brought my sample to 53 observations of data breach announcements. This 
will act as my base dataset.   
 
The second dataset contains a list of every data breach announcement, regardless of size, from 
2005 – 2018. The source of the data is “Privacy Rights Clearinghouse”, an online provider of data 
breach information. The dataset includes 8,981 observations. The important variable contained in 
this data is the day of announcement (event date).   
 
The third dataset contains time series financial data. The source of the data is Datastream, a 
software by Thomas Reuters Eikon that provides financial data on securities and economic 
indicators for 175 countries. I used this software to compile daily closing prices adjusted for trading 
days, market to book ratios, and market capitalizations for the companies in my base dataset.  
 
I superimposed the event dates and financial data into my base dataset of 53 observations of data 
breach announcements. A summary of the most important variables in the dataset is shown in 
Table 2 below. 
 
  
 Satkofsky 7 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Records Lost 53.000 27031590.849 39147114.369 97,000 1.450e+08 
Year of Announcement 53.000 2,013.208 3.444 2,005 2,018 
Repeat Offender 53.000 0.264 0.445 0.000 1.000 
Market to Book 53.000 4.408 4.483 -3.290 24.760 
Market Capitalization 53.000 137,631.967 174,080.975 1,823.840 741,632.875 
Time Period (2005-2011) 53.000 0.208 0.409 0.000 1.000 
Time Period (2011-2014 53.000 0.434 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Time Period (2015-2016) 53.000 0.151 0.361 0.000 1.000 
Time Period (2017-2018) 53.000 0.208 0.409 0.000 1.000 
Financial  53.000 0.208 0.409 0.000 1.000 
Healthcare 53.000 0.057 0.233 0.000 1.000 
Tech 53.000 0.151 0.361 0.000 1.000 
Retail 53.000 0.434 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Telecom 53.000 0.151 0.361 0.000 1.000 
Records Lost by MCap 53.000 2,078.836 5,880.539 0.482 33,219.723 
      
 
A description of these variables and their context within the event study is provided as follows: 
Records Lost: The number of individual records breached. This is useful in representing the size 
of each data breach. 
Year of Announcement: The year of the data breach announcement. This is useful in creating 
dummy variables for time periods.  
Repeat Offender: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has experienced a data breach 
announcement prior to the current instance. This is useful in testing Hypothesis 2.  
Market to Book (MB): A company’s market capitalization divided by its book value. This ratio is 
used as a proxy for growth expectations of a company. I would expect companies with higher 
growth expectations to experience larger negative responses from the public. This is useful in 
testing Hypothesis 5.  
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Market Capitalization: The market value of a company. It is equal to shares outstanding x share 
price. This is useful in scaling the size of each data breach.  
Time Periods: Dummy variables equal to 1 for companies that fall within the specified time 
periods. I have divided the time into 4 periods of equal data breach announcement frequency to 
test the concept of “privacy fatigue”. This is useful in testing Hypothesis 6. 
Financial, Healthcare, Tech, Retail, Telecom: Dummy variables equal to 1 for companies that fall 
within the specified industries. These variables will be used to test for response variation by 
industry. To see the distribution of breaches by sector, refer to Appendix. This is useful in testing 
Hypothesis 4. 
Records Lost by MCap: The Records Lost variable divided by the Market Capitalization variable. 
This variable scales the breach size by company size. This is useful in testing Hypothesis 3. 
 
To visualize the growth in breach size from 2005 – 2018, see Graph 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Records Lost by Year 
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V. Event Study Methodology 
 
I will follow the event-study methodology outlined by MacKinlay (1997). This method is 
commonly used to measure the effects of an economic event (announcement of data breach) on 
the value of a company (stock price). The steps and models are outlined below.  
 
1: The first step is to obtain the OLS estimators from the market model over the estimation 
window:  
(1)  Rit= αi + βiRmt + εit 
E(εit = 0)   Var(εit) = s2 
The market model relates the return of any given security to the return of the market portfolio.  Rit 
and Rmt are the period t returns on security i and the market portfolio respectively. The securities 
are the stocks for the companies in my sample. The S&P 500 Index will serve as a proxy for the 
market portfolio. αi is the intercept of the relationship for stock i. βi (beta) is the slope of the 
relationship between security i and the market portfolio. εit is simply the error term with E(εit = 0) 
and Var(εit) = s2.  
 
The announcement of the data breach is the event day for each observation. With event day of t = 
0, the parameters αi and βi are estimated using OLS over the estimation window (-240 trading days, 
-5 trading days). I have selected a start date almost a year before the event to allow enough time 
for accurate estimation of the parameters. I have selected a finish date 5 days before the event to 
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prevent contamination from leaked information.  The estimation window is useful in predicting 
the expected return of security i in the absence of a data breach announcement.  
 
2: The second step is to use the OLS estimators from the estimation window to predict the expected 
returns of the security in the absence of a data breach announcement:   
(2)  E(Rit) = αi + βiRmt + εit 
The market model uses the actual returns of the market over the event window and OLS estimators 
from the estimation period to predict the expected returns of security i over the event window (0 
trading days, 2 trading days). With event day of t = 0, I have selected a tight event window of 3 
days to ensure the returns will capture all announcement effects without picking up other market 
noise.   
 
3: The third step is to compute the abnormal returns for security i over the event window:  
(3)  ARit = Rit − E(Rit) 
The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return (Rit) and expected return E(Rit) of 
security i on day t. This model is computed over the event window (0,2). 
 
4: The fourth step is to compute the CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) for stock i over the event 
window: 
(4)  CARit = ∑ARit 
CARi is the summed abnormal returns for security i over the event window (0,2).  
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5: The fifth step is to compute the ACAR (Average Cumulative Abnormal Return) for all 
companies over the event window:  
(5)  ACAR = 
1
𝑁
∑CARit 
ACAR is the sum of all CARs divided by the number of observations in the sample (53). 
 
6: The sixth and final step of the event-study methodology is to test the selected characteristics 
using Cross-Sectional Analysis.  
(6)  CARi = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1Repeat + 𝛾2MB + 𝛾3TimePeriod2+ 
𝛾4TimePeriod3 + 𝛾5TimePeriod4 + 𝛾6Healthcare + 
𝛾7Tech+ 𝛾8Retail + 𝛾9Telecoms + 
𝛾10RecordsLostbyMCap + εi 
 
By regressing the CAR for each security (company) on the characteristics mentioned in the 
Hypotheses Section, I can better understand the characteristics potentially driving the differences 
in abnormal returns amongst the events. The 𝛾’s are the coefficients on the explanatory variables.  
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VI. ACAR Results 
 
To test the public’s response to data breaches, I will calculate the ACAR over my sampled 
companies using Equation (5). The results are shown below in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: ACAR Results 
VARIABLE Obs Mean 
(ACAR) 
Pos:Neg T-Test Min Max 
CAR 53 -.931 21:32 -2.195 -11.442 7.537 
Note: CAR and ACAR are in % 
 
Overall, I find that the average response (ACAR) to data breach announcements is -.93%. With a 
T-Test of -2.195, the negative response is statistically significant at the .05 level, I reject my first 
null hypothesis that the ACAR (Average Cumulative Abnormal Return) for companies that 
experience a data breach is zero. The results show a large range with a minimum CAR of -11.4% 
and a maximum CAR of 7.5%. Another thing to note is the large number of observations that 
returned positive CARs. Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the distribution of CARs. As 
shown, the density of CARs is widely varied. 
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Figure 2: Density of CARs 
To quantify the realized financial effect a data breach announcement would have on a company, I 
will multiply the ACAR by the median market capitalization of companies in my sample. Market 
capitalization is equivalent to shares outstanding x share price. The median market capitalization 
amongst companies in my sample is roughly $55 Billion. Therefore, a 3-day loss of .93% equates 
to a $512 million loss in market value for the median sized company. That is a heavy loss that can 
have multiplicative negative effects on other areas of a company. 
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VII. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
To test the relationship between selected characteristics and the magnitude and directions of stock 
market returns, I will conduct a cross-sectional analysis using Equation (6). The results are shown 
in Table 4 below.  
Table 4: Cross-Sectional Analysis Results 
 (1) 
VARIABLES CAR 
  
Repeat Offender -1.410 
 (1.181) 
Market to Book 0.094 
 (0.120) 
Time Period2 (2011-2014) -2.414* 
 (1.311) 
Time Period3 (2015-2016) -1.307 
 (1.615) 
Time Period4 (2016-2018) -0.466 
 (1.536) 
Healthcare 0.371 
 (2.103) 
Tech 1.542 
 (1.503) 
Retail 0.859 
 (1.384) 
Telecoms 1.226 
 (1.488) 
Records Lost by MCap -0.0001* 
 (0.0001) 
Constant -0.123 
 (1.249) 
  
Observations 53 
R-squared 0.189 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Upon examination, I find many economically meaningful, but few statistically significant 
characteristics.  
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The coefficient for the Repeat Offender variable is negative and statistically insignificant. For the 
sampled companies, repeat offenders induce greater negative returns. The public, aware that these 
companies have not learned from past mistakes, punishes them harder. This could potentially be 
explained by a loss of trust in said companies. Overall, I fail to reject my null hypothesis stating 
that companies who have experienced a data breach announcement prior to the current instance do 
not matter. 
 
The coefficients for the industry dummy variables are all positive and statistically insignificant. It 
appears that sectors do not have a direct correlation to the magnitude of returns. This could 
potentially be explained by the limits of my sample. The majority of my sample companies fall 
within the tech sector. To test the implications of sector differences more accurately, I could have 
divided the tech sector into sub categories. Regardless, I fail to reject my null hypothesis that the 
industry does not matter. 
 
The coefficient for Records Lost scaled by Market Capitalization is negative and statistically 
significant at the .01 level. The larger the breach, the greater the negative returns. The implications 
of the small coefficient (-.0001) is heightened when I account for the large range of this variable 
(min .482, max 33,220). For my sample, I conclude that the public is very mindful of the number 
of individuals affected by each breach. I reject my null hypothesis that the size of the breach does 
not matter at the .01 level.  
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The coefficient for Market to Book is positive and statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, the 
characteristic is economically meaningful. My intuition was that companies with higher expected 
growth (higher MB ratios) would experience greater negative returns because I would anticipate 
the negative announcements to undermine their growth. From the sampled companies, I found the 
opposite. The coefficient’s tight zero implies that the growth opportunities of companies have no 
relation to the magnitude of negative returns. This could potentially be explained by the public’s 
sole concern on severity of breach, regardless of company financials. I fail to reject my null 
hypothesis that the expected growth of a company does not matter.  
 
The coefficients for the dummy variables for Time Periods increase over time. Despite the lack of 
statistical significance amongst all periods, the results are immensely economically meaningful. 
For the sampled companies, I confirm my intuition that “privacy fatigue” is occurring as the 
announcements of data breaches exponentially grow. The most alarming takeaway is that the 
public’s response is decreasing over small time periods at a large rate. The coefficients steadily 
increase from -2.4 to -1.3 to -.5. This implies that a data breach announcement in time period 2011 
– 2014 returned a nearly 2% more negative return than an announcement in time period 2017 – 
2018. However, I fail to reject my null hypothesis that the time period when a data breach is 
announced does not matter.  
 
The R-Squared statistic shows how much of the variation in CAR amongst the sampled companies 
is explained by my model. With a low R-squared of .189, my model predicts roughly 19% of the 
variation in CARs. Nevertheless, previous literature results have also produced low values. The 
low R-squares could potentially be explained by the extreme variation in the stock market. Stock 
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prices constantly fluctuate because of new information and investor expectations, creating an 
extremely noisy and unpredictable by nature market.  
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
I examined the public’s response to data breaches and found that data breach announcements 
generate negative stock returns for the companies at fault. These negative responses have major 
financial implications and greatly reduce the market values of these companies. I find that larger 
breaches (Records Lost by MCap) induce greater negative returns. I also explore the concept of 
“privacy fatigue” and find evidence suggestive that the public is growing tired of responding to 
data breaches. This finding insinuates an even bigger opportunity for companies to exploit the 
public. Without fear of retribution, companies have no incentive to invest in data security.  
 
As information available online continues to increase, it is important that the public responds 
appropriately to infringements of privacy. The analysis of data breaches will need to be explored 
further. For future research, I suggest drawing from a larger sample of data breaches that includes 
characteristics for breach type and accounts for observations with confounding announcements 
(e.g. mergers, managements, earnings). In addition, I suggest extending research to examine the 
variation in public response by country. With many differences at the country level, the results 
could be very interesting. Overall, my results should motivate companies to invest in data privacy 
and the public to respond more negatively to data breaches. 
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